SocialContractProblem

Social contract theory is (mainly used as) a justification for state authority - it supposes citizens made an agreement or contract to live under authority.

One problem for social contract theory is that such an agreement never actually took place.

Against this, it is sometimes argued that citizens do so well from the results of the imaginary contract they would be insane not to have signed up to it if the occasion had arisen, and therefore have in fact effectively signed up to it - or something like that.

But the other problem for social contract theory is that the agreement never would take place, even if the occasion arose. This is because, as David Braybooke ('The Insoluble Problem of the Social Contract', reprinted in 'Paradoxes of Rationality and Cooperation' Vancouver 1985) points out, the Social Contract is effectively a public good that no one would voluntarily contribute to.

(Phil - I wonder if you've still got this book, which we both bought in the remainders bookshop in the new lanes in Brighton some years ago.)

There are two versions of Social Contract to consider:

Form 1 - agents promise to establish an organised society and live under laws

Form 2 - agents promise to assign authority to a sub-group of agents 'and respect its exercise by that person or persons thereafter'

We start in a 'state of nature' where neither law nor authority exists. David Braybrooke's agents are sheep farmers, though they collect rosehips for vitamin c. If the contract is instituted, there will be enough rosehips for all and people will stop pinching each others' sheep.

But the social contract is effectively a public good. The Social Contract will bring benefits to all (assuming non-excludability) if it is created, whether or not they have contributed. Hence rational individualistic agents won't contribute if there is any cost to doing so.

The contribution may be something as trivial as signing your name to the contract, or leaving the sheep farm 'to join the assembled multitude', or foregoing sheep-rustling while others are away signing the contract. In the longer term, there is an ongoing contribution to keeping the contract (though that is where authority gets introduced.)

Braybooke discusses an example of a case where the contract might just work. This is the narrow peninsula of Digby Neck, Nova Scotia. A row of sheep farms straddle the width of the peninsula. This creates a special visibility where farmers can identify with certainty who has been rustling - on the assumption that 'no agent can cross the boundary of another's farm without being detected and that the livestock on each farm are so placed as to let any given animal wander over the boundary only of one other farm.'

It is about more than just visibility though. You need to have visibility in order to have excludability - but excludability is only relevant if there is in fact a good to exclude people from. For instance, suppose to join the contract everyone has to stand up, be identified and sign their name (assuming the group is small enough for this to be meaningful.) But if only two farmers turn up to sign their names, and meanwhile everyone else is off rustling their sheep, signing the contract hasn't done them much good.

Would agents turn up to sign a social contract in these conditions?

: Possibly, yes. In the beginning of the century, Dr. Zamenhof had an interesting way of propagating esperanto. He'd have people sign an agreement that, basically, "I will learn esperanto if more than 10 000 people sign this agreement". This is a case of public good - learning esperanto is obviously only worthwhile if enough people learn it (Though the constraints are differerent, since it doesn't benefit to non-esperanto speakers).

: In the farmers' case, the equivalent would be "raise your hands if you agree to carry on this plan if half the people here raise their hands". There is no risk in agreeing to the social contract, since you only sign it if enough people agree to it. - EmileKroeger